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Abstract
Aircraft survivability is a key metric that contributes
to the overall system effectiveness of military aircraft as
well as to a lower life cycle cost. The aircraft designer,
thus, must have a complete and thorough understanding
of the interrelationships between the components of
survivability and the other traditional disciplines as well
as how they affect the overall life cycle cost of the
aircraft.  If this understanding occurs, the designer can
then evaluate which components and technologies will
create the most robust aircraft system with the best system
effectiveness at the lowest cost.   A synthesis and
modeling environment is formulated and presented that
will allow trade-off studies and analysis of survivability
concepts to be conducted.  This environment then
becomes the testbed used to develop a  comprehensive
and structured probabilistic methodology, called the
Probabilistic System of System Effectiveness
Methodology (POSSEM), that will allow these trades to
be conducted.  Initially, consideration of the survivability
discipline will be restricted to components of aircraft
susceptibility. The methodology is presented here in its
formative state, with primary issues being identified and
tentative solutions presented.  A theater level test case of
susceptibility trades is presented.
Introduction
In the current world military environment, system
effectiveness takes on a new meaning. In the past,
military aircraft design has been characterized by an
emphasis to design for optimum performance.  Aircraft
success was defined in terms of the aircraft’s ability to
perform at least as well as the requirements to which it
was designed, including adaptability to rapidly changing
threat environments.  Recent imperatives, however, have
shifted the emphasis from performance to overall system
effectiveness as a key measure of merit for the aircraft.
Today, system effectiveness must not focus only on the
aircraft’s performance, but instead on its ability to
satisfactorily complete its mission, against a wide variety
of threats and situations, at an affordable life cycle cost.
Until recently, preliminary aircraft design focused on
tradeoffs between the traditional disciplines:
aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, etc.  However,
issues such as technological advances and life cycle
considerations have induced a shift of emphasis in
preliminary design to include non-conventional
disciplines.  These disciplines, often called the “-ilities”,
include subjects like maintainability, reliability, and
safety, as well as crossover disciplines such as economics
and stability and control.  One of these disciplines is that
of survivability, primarily of concern with military
aircraft.  The creation of such entities as the Joint
Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability
(JTCG/AS), whose primary goal is to advance and
establish the design discipline of survivability1, indicates
the growing importance of this new field.
Survivability is defined by Ball to be “the capability
of an aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a man-made
hostile environment”2.  This capability is measured by the
parameter Ps, the probability of survival, which in turn is
related to the probability of kill, Pk, by the following
relationship:
Ps = 1- Pk
The probability of kill is the product of two key
survivability concepts: susceptibility and vulnerability.
Susceptibility is the probability that the aircraft will be
detected and hit, and is a function of those things that
would make the aircraft more difficult to be seen and
tracked, such as stealth, maneuverability, tactics, and
advanced avionics. Vulnerability, on the other hand,
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concerns itself with the probability that the aircraft will be
killed if hit.  This makes vulnerability a function of
detailed aircraft design, including specific armament,
system locations and redundancies.  Much work has been
done in the area of vulnerability reduction, with
susceptibility becoming more of a major concern in recent
years primarily in the development of today’s stealthy
aircraft, such as the Lockheed Martin F-22.  Because
these survivability concepts are themselves functions of
basic design parameters and requirements, as are the other
more traditional design disciplines, it becomes both
necessary and cost-effective to consider survivability as a
design discipline in its own right, allowing tradeoffs to
occur at the preliminary design stage, thus optimizing the
aircraft to an overall system effectiveness metric with a
resulting reduction in design cycle time.
The Importance of Survivability
Survivability is important on several levels.  As a
function of worldwide military conflicts, political
instabilities, economic uncertainties, increasing defense
budget constraints, and the high cost and sophistication of
modern military aircraft, we are being asked to do more
with less3.  Our forces are being asked to generate more
sorties for more diverse missions with fewer assets. Each
aircraft is experiencing increased utilization. An aircraft
that is more survivable is, in general, safer and more
reliable during peacetime operations.  In turn, a safer,
more reliable aircraft has a reduced overall life cycle cost
and is thus more affordable.  This concept is shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1- Relationship between Survivability and LCC
During conflicts, an aircraft that is more survivable
has a greater chance of fulfilling its mission and returning
safely to base.  This increases its probability of success
for any given operation, as well as allowing the aircraft to
remain a useful and viable tool for future missions. More
importantly, the more survivable an aircraft is, the greater
chance its pilot and crew have of returning unscathed.
The moral, societal, and economic cost of losing a trained
pilot or crewmember is tremendous.
An interesting study was done with Desert Storm data
that illustrates the effect that enhancing survivability can
have.  The study showed that when Ps changed from 98%
to 99%, the changes in surviving force go from 36% to
60% (51 sorties).  For 100 aircraft, a  Ps of 98% allows
3151 targets while a Ps of 99% allows 3970 targets.
Therefore, a 1% increase in survivability gives a 26%
increase in force effectiveness3. In other words, linear
changes in survivability produce exponential changes in
force effectiveness.
Finally, it is important to note the expense of trying to
add survivability features to an existing aircraft.  The
addition of many survivability concepts often involve a
compromise with other features.  For example, an aircraft
that sports an ideal configuration for stealth could be
inefficient aerodynamically and may need to rely on
sophisticated and expensive control systems.  In addition,
adding survivability features later often substantially
increases aircraft weight, reducing performance and
economic viability.  By considering survivability as a
discipline during the preliminary design process, these
trades can be optimized and their effects analyzed, at
potentially considerable savings in cost.
System of Systems Effectiveness
Given the importance of survivability as a design
discipline, the question now becomes: how can
survivability be incorporated into the preliminary design
process?  In order to successfully include survivability
features into a design, the effect of these features must be
identified and quantified early enough in the design
process to allow for sufficient trade-offs and resource
allocation.  The methodology presented here proposes that
in order to properly assess the effect of survivability
features, the analysis must be conducted at a level higher
than that of the aircraft.  The analysis should take place at
the theater level, making the problem a system of systems
investigation.
The Aircraft as the System
The Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) at
the Georgia Institute of Technology has formulated
probabilistic methodologies that treat individual
aerospace concepts as the system4,5,6,7.  These
methodologies revolve around the creation of meta-
models, based on regression methods, that relate vehicle
design variables (geometry, engine specifications, drag
polars, etc.) to  vehicle responses (takeoff gross weight,
thrust-to-weight  ratio, etc.).  Further advances in the
methodology added economic variables, requirements and
mission constraints, as well as analysis of the effect of
new technologies.  In this way, the aircraft itself was
treated as the system, and aircraft Measures of
Performance (MOPs) were the metrics used to assess the
“goodness” of the system (Figure 2).  System
effectiveness, therefore, was a function only of that
aircraft’s design variables and parameters.
While this method of analysis resulted in the design of
a vehicle that was optimized to its own mission and
performance requirements, the vehicle remained
independent of its role in the larger system: the theater.  In
other words, the aircraft was never placed in its correct








Figure 2-Analysis of the Aircraft as the System8
The Theater: System of Systems
In order to place the aircraft in its correct context, the
system must be redefined.  No longer is the aircraft the
system; rather, the theater becomes the system, and the
aircraft is relegated to being a component of this new
system.  The theater thus becomes a system of systems
and is a function of the vehicle-level components of the
larger system, including the aircraft.
There is, however, a missing level in this formulation.
The outputs of the vehicle level (performance parameters)
do not usually map directly as the inputs to theater level
modeling codes.  Rather, the inputs at the theater level
usually consist of probability of kill values or
effectiveness values for component vs. component
encounters.  There must be an intermediary mapping that
takes the outputs of the vehicle level as its inputs, and in
turn generates outputs that serve as inputs to the theater
level.  This is illustrated in Figure 3.  Theater level
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are functions of
vectors of subsystem Measures of Performance, which in
turn are functions of subsystem requirements, design and
economic variables, and technology factors.
Figure 3- Mapping and Sensitivity Cascades Relating Vehicle Characteristics to Theater Level MoEs
When the methodology is complete, there will exist a
continuous mapping between vehicle level design
parameters and theater level Measures of Effectiveness.
Changes at the vehicle level can thus be propagated all the
way to the theater level.  Instead of optimizing an aircraft,
for example, to its own pre-defined performance and
mission constraints, the aircraft can now be optimized to
fulfill theater level goals and objectives.  In addition, as
more system level components are treated as input
variables, tradeoffs can be established not only at the
individual component level, but across the components.
In other words, the methodology will allow tradeoffs
between, say, the effectiveness of a cruise missile
compared to an aircraft carrying a specified weapons
load.  Tradeoffs could also be made between the number
of system components needed: two of aircraft “A” could
produce the same effectiveness of five of aircraft “B”, but
at less cost.  Thus, the methodology becomes a key device
for design decisions as well as resource allocation.
Finally, the completed methodology can be used to
actually determine the mission and design requirements
for the vehicles themselves that comprise the system.  By
using the Measures of Effectiveness at the theater level as
a measure of goodness, tradeoffs can be made between
vehicle design and mission requirements.  These
requirements, when optimized to maximize the overall
effectiveness of the system, become the requirements to
which the vehicles are then designed.
Methodology
The methodology presented here is called the
Probabilistic System of Systems Effectiveness
Methodology (POSSEM) and can be used to assess
survivability tradeoffs during the preliminary design
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process.  The methodology is still in its formative state
and will continue to evolve over time. The framework is
presented here, along with considerations and analysis
challenges that still need to be met.  POSSEM is an
extrapolation of existing probabilistic and statistical
ASDL methods (referenced earlier) and incorporates
tentative solutions to issues that are a function of the new
theater level analysis.  These issues have been
summarized in Reference 9.  The methodology is shown
in Figure 4.  The following sections detail each
methodology component, including analysis challenges
and possible solutions.
Figure 4- POSSEM: Formulation of Methodology Used to Assess System Effectiveness and Survivability Trades
Defining the Problem
A well-defined problem is the foundation of a
successful analysis.  There are three main factors that are
of consideration in the problem definition phase of
POSSEM: establishing the baselines, choosing the inputs
and outputs, and defining the scenario.  These three things
must be established concurrently, as they are each
dependant on the others, as shown in Figure 4.
Establish the Baseline(s)
The first step is to establish baselines for the systems
of interest.  In the survivability case, the baseline would
be the aircraft to which the survivability concepts are to
be applied, but could also be sub-system components
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(such as an avionics package), new technologies, or other
vehicles, such as missiles or other weapon delivery
systems.  The purpose of the baseline is to have an
established reference point with which to compare results.
Define the Inputs and Outputs
The inputs and outputs are at the heart of the analysis.
Inputs must be chosen at the vehicle (or subsystem) level
that will allow adequate representation of the concepts
and technologies that are to be explored.  For code
considerations, these inputs must be easily manipulated.
Unlike the established methodologies referenced earlier,
the outputs will not be at the vehicle level, but rather will
be theater level output metrics (Measures of
Effectiveness).  Careful consideration of both inputs and
outputs should be made in order to ensure that the outputs
are meaningful functions of the inputs.  A screening test is
helpful for this step.
Define the Scenarios
A scenario and/or operational situation must be
defined that captures both the input parameters as well as
the outputs.  The scenario must be suitably complex to
model all significant interactions, yet be free from
unnecessary, and sometimes confusing, detail.  For
example, the initial scenario defined in Reference 9
modeled four SAM sites protecting a single airbase.
However, the geometry of the problem caused only one
SAM site to be activated by the flight path of the aircraft.
All four SAM sites were carried through the analysis,
increasing code run time and complexity.  A simple
geometric pre-analysis would have identified the problem
earlier, and changes in both input and output could have
been made.
For the survivability case, the threats are of paramount
importance.  Indeed, the definition of the threats drive the
survivability solution!  By defining the threats in careful
conjunction with the inputs and outputs, a useful analysis
will result.  A more comprehensive method is to treat the
threats probabilistically.  By allowing the threats to vary
(within reasonable bounds), the vehicle is optimized to a
more robust solution.  A probabilistic threat environment
is inherent to POSSEM.
The “Human in the Loop” Problem
A major difference between vehicle level and theater
level analysis codes is how the user interacts with the
code.  In a traditional vehicle sizing code, the user will
supply a set of inputs and the code will iterate on a sizing
scheme to converge the vehicle according to the laws of
physics and empirical relationships.  In many theater
codes, however, the user becomes an integral part of the
analysis process.  This means that the user periodically
evaluates the effect of his/her decisions and can then
change the parameters (either from that point or change
initial input parameters and rerun the simulation) to
provide improved results. Figure 5 shows a typical
analysis scheme for using a theater level code.
The alternative to having the human in the loop is to
use some sort of embedded rules (expert systems) to make
decisions.  There are some theater level codes that do this.
The key drawback to this is that the rules have an inherent
lack of flexibility to simulate real operational plans.  In
addition, these rules lack transparency in assessing cause
and effect relationships.  An example of this drawback in
illustrated in the following example.  Say that an
embedded rule system is used to model the decisions
made in a particular scenario.  The results are summarized
as follows: “The analysis shows that there is an 85%
probability that this scenario (with its inputs) results in the
loss of two aircraft carriers in the first four days of the
event.”  What is wrong with this statement?  In the real
world, losing two aircraft carriers is so completely
unacceptable that, after the loss of the first carrier, the
decisions (inputs) would be changed in order to ensure
that a second carrier would not be lost.  With embedded
rules, unrealistic results such as these could be modeled
and erroneous decisions made.
Figure 5- Decision-Making Flowchart for Theater
Level Code10
Decision Nodes
The question now becomes: how do we apply a
probabilistic methodology if we need to maintain the
information provided by having human in the loop? First,
the scenario is examined and key decision nodes are
identified.  The concept of decision trees is useful here,
and can aid in identifying the impact of key decisions.
In addition to using decision trees to identify and
model key decision points, the concept of Sequence-
Dependant Response Surface Equations (SDRSEs) will be
explored, and is discussed in a subsequent section.
Another advantage of this formulation is that
probability distributions could be applied to each possible
path at each node.  In this way, the human decision maker
can be modeled.  For example, a decision node may have
two identified paths.  A “practical” decision might have,
say, an 80% chance of occurring while a more
“aggressive” decision would only be chosen 20% of the
time.  In this way, one could model the personalities and
decision-making abilities of several different types of
decision makers, but with the ability to assess them in one
modeled environment.  Bayesian inference techniques


























POSSEM needs to have at its heart a synthesis
environment to operate upon. As discussed earlier, the
analysis needs to be conducted at three levels: the vehicle
(or subsystem) level, the mission level, and the theater
level.  Appropriate synthesis codes that represent these
three levels must be identified.  In addition, the outputs of
the vehicle level code must be compatible with the inputs
of the mission level code, and the outputs of the mission
level code must be compatible with the inputs of the
theater level code.  Finally, a seamless integration
between the three (or more) codes must be created.
Response Surface Methodology
Response Surface Methodology (RSM), in
conjunction with a Design of Experiments (DoE)
formulation, is then applied to the linked synthesis codes.
RSM is an efficient, multivariable approach to system
modeling that defines clear cause-and-effect relationships
between design variables and system responses, and is
based on a statistical approach to building and rapidly
assessing empirical metamodels11,12.
The RSM methodology, employing a DOE strategy,
creates metamodels of a particular synthesis code by
selecting a subset of all possible combinations of
variables to run which will guarantee orthogonality (i.e.
the independence of the various design variables).  Using
regression techniques, the subset of inputs are related to
the selected outputs to create an equation that represents
the relationship between inputs and outputs of the
synthesis code.  This technique allows the maximum
amount of information to be gained from the fewest
number of experiment executions, and thus provides trade
study results in a more cost-effective manner.
Sequence Dependent Response Surface
Equations
Because probability distributions were placed around
the key decision nodes, the resulting metamodels mapping
outputs to inputs will also be probabilistic in nature.  A
sequence dependant response surface equation (SDRSE)
would model an input variable that changes during the
course of the analysis.  Instead of the response being a
function of a set of variables, the response would be a
function of a vector of variables.  Each vector would
represent the set of decisions that could be made at each
decision node. The precise formulation of these SDRSEs
remain a current research issue.
Final Analysis
The final analysis consists of several tools that
together provide useful information to the designer and
decision-maker.  The first of these is the prediction
profile, generated by a statistical analysis package called
JMP13.  The prediction profile is a graphical
representation of the response surface equations, showing
how the responses vary with respect to each variable. In
essence, the sloped lines depict the partial derivatives of
the response with respect to the variable with all other
variables set to their nominal value.  JMP allows the
designer to change the value of the variables by using a
click and drag technique.  The graph is then updated in
real time, showing the new values of the responses, which
are the effects of the changes.  The designer can thus
manipulate the equations to gain insight into the problem
and also seek optimal configurations.
If probability distributions are assigned to the initial
input variables, a Monte Carlo analysis can be conducted
utilizing the RSEs.  Remember that the inputs can
represent geometric changes or infused technologies.  By
creating a probability distribution around the values
(taking care that the ranges of the distribution fall inside
the range of the computed RSEs), families of designs can
be considered and analyzed. The results of the Monte
Carlo analysis are probability density functions (PDFs)
and their integrals, the cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) which show the probability or confidence of
achieving a certain value. The designer can interpret
information from the probability distributions in a number
of ways.  If the distribution has quite a bit of variability,
but some or most of it fulfills the requirement being
examined, this would suggest that the assumptions,
including any technology infusions, are viable.  It would
be beneficial, therefore, to invest more resources into the
technologies or options that the assumptions represent.
This addition of resources could have the effect of
narrowing the uncertainty associated with the
technologies or options.  On the other hand, if the
distribution indicates that the probability of meeting the
requirement is low, then it might be more provident to
examine other options before investing money into a
technology or decision that might not be sufficient to
solve the problem.  This kind of system-level
investigation can also show how much the detrimental
effects of certain decisions are penalizing the system.
This information, shared with the disciplinary experts that
engage in the development of the technologies or
assumptions, could be investigated to see how resources
need to be allocated towards reducing the penalties, as
opposed to improving benefits.
There are several other techniques that may be
employed at this point to conduct further analysis and
optimization.  The first of these is a technique pioneered
at ASDL called Joint Probabilistic Decision Making
(JPDM)14. This technique combines multi-criteria into a
single metric, the probability of success.   POSSEM will
initially explore JPDM as the primary decision making
process in the methodology.
Theater Level Application
Although POSSEM may theoretically be applied to
any complex system of systems, the survivability test case
was chosen as a proof of concept of the methodology.
Specifically, susceptibility tradeoffs were desired.  In
Reference 9, the basic, existing methodology was applied
to the theater level only and was used to aid in the
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identification of methodology issues.  Those issues have
been identified and POSSEM proposed.  The next step
was to implement the methodology again at the theater
level, this time using inputs and outputs that model a
survivability scenario.  Again, this step is used to identify
any specific survivability issues that need to be addressed
in the methodology.  Also, the results from this example
will be used to help identify mission level codes that will
be needed for the synthesis step of the process.
Problem Definition
The first step of the example process was to define the
problem.  As shown in the POSSEM flowchart, defining
the baseline(s), scenario, and inputs and outputs is an
iterative process.  For this case, susceptibility tradeoffs
were key.  Therefore, a scenario was needed that would
allow effective modeling of baseline vehicles and
technologies as well as enable susceptibility tradeoffs to
take place.  In addition, variables are limited to those
available in the theater level code of choice.
Baseline
It was decided to model two notional aircraft with
different susceptibility and performance features.  One
aircraft would be a stealthier, more maneuverable aircraft
that would have a limited weapons load.  The other
aircraft would have a substantial weapons load capability,
but would be slower, less agile, and less stealthy.  The
weapons themselves would have identical capabilities, but
the number of weapons carried by each aircraft would
differ.  In addition, the aircraft were differentiated by
mission duration and turnaround time.  The aircraft are
compared in Figure 6.
Figure 6- Comparison of Notional Strike Aircraft
Used in Study
Scenario
Because aircraft were selected as the baselines, an
unclassified notional air superiority scenario was chosen.
The scenario needed to be simple enough to be able to
clearly identify results of tradeoffs (especially since this
first case is a proof of concept) yet complex enough to
capture important interactions between variables.  An
extrapolation of the basic scenario used in Reference 9
was chosen.  This scenario models a situation in which
South Florida attacks North Florida and is shown in
Figure 7.  Two airbases are established in South Florida
and the notional aircraft stationed there.  The target is an
airbase in North Florida that is protected by four SAM
sites.
The SAM sites are distributed around the airbase.
Each sites has identical features, including the same
number of launch rails, reload time, antenna height, and
engagement radius.  However, there are two different kind
of weapons defined that differ in terms of range, speed,
and altitude (Figure 8).  Two of the airbases have one type
of weapon and the other two have the second type.
Figure 7- Florida Scenario
Figure 8- SAM Site Weapon Comparison
Features of the South Florida (Blue) airbases are not
crucial to the study.  The two notional aircraft are
assigned to each Blue airbase and a surplus of weapons
are available.  The North Florida (Red) airbase features
runways, shelters, revetments, and aircraft in the open.
These aircraft do not mobilize to defend the airbase, but
are rather targets.  The only defense of the Red airbase
comes from the surrounding SAM sites.
The air campaign consists of hourly attacks on the
Red airbase for a total of 8 hours.  Blue airbases alternate
attacks, so each airbase launches a total of four strikes,
consisting of five aircraft per strike mission.  Each aircraft
Weapon RSAM-1 RSAM-2
Min Range (nm) 2 1
Max Range (nm) 20 15
Speed (kts) 600 800
no factor Min Alt (ft) 2000 1000
no factor Max Alt (ft) 18000 14000
Rel. Detectability 0.5 0.5
Ph 0.9 0.9
Engagement Time (min) 1.5 0.5
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is assigned one of five targets: a SAM fire control, a SAM
radar, a runway, a shelter, or aircraft in the open.  Flight
paths are straight line from airbase to airbase.  SAM sites
and Red airbase features are allowed a variable repair
rate.  There is no repair rate for Blue aircraft.  SAM sites
defend automatically when detecting incoming aircraft.
Inputs and Metrics of Effectiveness
Input choices were limited to those available in the
synthesis code.  Those variables most closely modeling
susceptibility/survivability concepts were chosen.  For
aircraft, the variables selected were detectability,
maneuverability, and turnaround time.  The detectability
variable models  the relative detectability of the aircraft,
and is a scaling factor used to reduce the probability of
detection of opposing forces against the aircraft.
Likewise, the maneuverability variable measures the
aircraft’s ability to evade defensive systems and is a
scaling factor used to reduce the probability of hit of
engaging weapons against the aircraft15.
Because POSSEM assumes a probabilistic threat
environment, several threat variables were chosen.  The
engagement range of SAM sites is allowed to vary, but all
four sites vary at the same time.  Additionally, repair rates
for the SAM fire control and radar systems, as well as
airbase runways, shelters and aircraft in the open were
selected as variables of interest.  Table 1 summarizes the
variables and their ranges.
Table 1- Input Variables for Study
Appropriate output Measures of Effectiveness were
chosen to illustrate the effect of the changing variables.
The surviving percentage of each aircraft is tracked, as
well as the number of each type of SAM weapon fired.
Finally, the number of runways and aircraft in the open
destroyed was tabulated.  These outputs are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2- Output Variables for Study
Synthesis
Because this study was conducted only at the theater
level, only a theater level code was utilized.  The code
selected was the Integrated Theater Engagement Model
(ITEM)15.  ITEM is an interactive, animated computer
simulation of military operations in theater-level
campaigns.  It has fully integrated air, land, and naval
(including amphibious) warfare modules and contains a
strong emphasis on visualization.  The inputs and output
are GUI-driven (Graphic User Interface), and an example
of this interface is shown in Figure 9.  ITEM is fully
object-oriented in design and execution and contains a
hierarchical structure of its database.
Figure 9- The ITEM Graphical Interface and
Environment
Because this test case is a proof of concept for using
POSSEM to assess survivability tradeoffs, the Sequence
Dependent Response Surface Equations were not
implemented (and, as discussed earlier, have not been
fully developed yet).  A standard Design of Experiments
was utilized to produce conventional Response Surface
Equations.  At this time, the RSEs are functions of the
theater level inputs discussed earlier.  As the project
progresses, codes will need to be identified that map
aircraft geometry and performance metrics to the
identified theater level inputs.






Theater Level Study Results
Figure 10 shows the prediction profile for the
survivability test case.  The first thing to notice is that
none of the repair rates for the airbase components have a
significant effect on the responses.  This is shown by a
relatively flat line.  There is a slight slope on the repair
rate for runways when compared to the number of
runways destroyed that does show a small effect of
increasing runway repair rate and decreasing number of
runways destroyed.  If the variable ranges on the repair
rates had been increased, or the air campaign plan
decreased, the repair rate could have had more impact.
The same result is seen with turnaround time for the two
aircraft.  The range around turnaround time was just too
small to have an impact, given the air campaign plan.
Track range for the SAM sites shows considerable
effect on the responses.  As the track range increases,
more weapons are fired, and more aircraft are killed.  This
is logical and intuitive.  In addition, the destruction of the
airbase components decreases.  Note the deflection of the
runway response to track range at its aft end.  This
indicates that the runway destruction begins to increase in
rate towards the end of the air campaign.  This could
indicate that SAM site damage has an effect on its ability
to protect the airbase components.  Interestingly, more
SAM-2 weapons are fired at the aft end of the campaign,
and the number of SAM-1 weapons appears to decrease
slightly.
Maneuverability can be seen to have a slight effect on
the number of airbase components destroyed, with the
Strike 2’s maneuverability playing a slightly more
significant role.  Because maneuverability primarily
affects the interaction between aircraft and SAM site, this
result is somewhat intuitive.  Once the aircraft has
penetrated the defenses successfully, the maneuverability
ceases to affect the actual kill.  But it is interesting to note
that increasing the maneuverability of Strike 2 (the
slower, higher load-carrying aircraft) has a more
significant impact than increasing that of Strike 1.
Increasing the maneuverability of both aircraft does have
a direct impact on the survivability of that aircraft.
Detectability shows less promise.  For Strike 2,
increasing the detectability has negligible effect on the
airbase components destroyed, as well as no discernable
effect on increasing its survivability.  For Strike 1,
increasing its detectability does have a small impact on
the number of airbase components destroyed and a small,
interesting impact on its own survivability.
Overall, it was discovered that the air campaign plan
had a significant effect on the quality of the results.  Force
mix was tried as a variable and was found to depend too
heavily on the specific order of air strikes.  This points to
significant interactions in the code that need to be
explored more fully.  For a very simple air campaign, it
was shown that increasing the percentage of Strike 1
aircraft in the overall number of aircraft did increase that
aircraft’s survivability.  However, this increase decreased
the survivability of the Strike 2 aircraft, and at a more
significant rate.  This concept of force mix is an
interesting one that will be explored further in the
development of the overall methodology.
Figure 10- Prediction Profile for Survivability Test Case at Theater Level
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